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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
What¹s the plan? 
President Putin has embarked upon an interesting approach to the fight against 
terrorism in the weeks since the Beslan tragedy: He has redefined Russia¹s view 
of terrorism, simultaneously recommending his redefinition of the term for the 
entire international community; he appointed a trusted associate as envoy to the 
conflict-prone southern region of Russia; and he has destabilized further 
domestic political institutions, in the name of strengthening hierarchical 
accountability. 
 
In an interview with Chinese newspapers and television, Putin laid out his 
concern with terminology by emphasizing the ideological change wrought by the 
end of the Cold War:  ³We must do away with the stereotypes and rhetoric of the 
³cold war,² when the same actions by practically the same organizations, but in 
different parts of the world were declaredŠto be either terrorist acts or a struggle 
for independence, a struggle for national liberation and so onŠ.We must 
understand that terrorists can be distinguished not by the goals that they hide 
behind, but by the methods that they use.  And the key element here is the use of 
violent methods that make innocent people suffer.²  (1)  Intriguing words from the 
president, but time will tell if this represents a true policy shift or only a rhetorical 
outreach for international support. 
 
The President¹s Representative to Southern Russia, Dmitri Kozak, has been 
busy putting out fires:  In Karachayevo-Cherkessia, he negotiated with protestors 
after the local police announced that they were seeking the arrest of the son-in-
law of the Republic¹s President, Mustafa Batuyev, in connection with the 
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abduction and murder of seven persons, including a regional legislator.  (2)  
Protestors demanded the resignation of the local leaders of the MVD and FSB.  
Kozak called for calm:  ³I request the kith and kin not to give way to these 
provocationsŠ. The criminal case will be investigated objectively and 
comprehensively and all those who organized this crime and those who executed 
it¾nearly all the perpetrators have been detained¾those who were directly or 
indirectly, be it in a juridical or political sense, to blame for the commission of this 
crime will be punished.² (3) Following the surrender of Ali Kaitov (Batuyev¹s son-
in-law), Kozak¹s spokesman suggested that there would be little purpose in the 
resignation of the local security chiefs. However, if public outrage over these 
murders (and the presumed complicity of authorities) does not subside, the 
Republic¹s President himself may be forced to resign. (4) 
 
Kozak also received a controversial assistant, a position that is in itself an 
unusual adjunct for an envoy; Ramzan Kadyrov, son of the assassinated 
Chechen President, was named as advisor to Kozak.  Opinions vary widely on 
the purpose, even the source of this appointment.  Whether it originated in the 
Kremlin, as some believe, or was requested by current Chechen President Alu 
Alkhanov, it is clear, as one analyst has noted that naming Kadyrov to a 
presidential post is more suitable than sidelining him otherwise: "Kadyrov's group 
is too influential to argue with it.² (5) (For more on this issue, please refer to the 
³Caucasus² section.) 
 
Clearly, there are a number of important, even urgent, issues for Putin¹s 
Representative to address, just how this will aid in the prevention of another 
terrorist attack or help bring to justice the organizers of Beslan however, has yet 
to be seen.  
  
The third of Putin¹s anti-terror initiatives likewise confounds analysis of its utility 
as part of a domestic security package.  While the harshest criticism of Putin has 
been reserved for his attempts to strengthen the ³vertical of power,² his intention 
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to override local authorities by nominating (with the right to dissolve local 
legislatures if they won¹t approve his nominations, Putin has taken de facto right 
of appointment) regional governors seems far more likely to stir up local 
discontent, rather than help the Center contain it.  
 
Putin has suggested that corruption and the inability to have federal executive 
orders implemented form the backdrop for his decision to intercede in regional 
politics, but it is becoming increasingly clear that any heavy-handed central move 
might instead propel centrifugal forces.  Consider, for example, the response of 
Mintimer Shaymiyev, President of Tatarstan, who disagreed, on democratic 
principles, with attempts to circumvent local assemblies, which reflect the choice 
of regional citizens: regional parliaments are elected by people's votes, "and we 
must not agree with the possibility of a regional parliament being dismissed." (6)  
 
Other regions present challenges on different fronts:  an insensitive central 
appointment in Dagestan, for instance, could, quite conceivably worsen ethnic 
tensions.  Sergei Artyunov, Director of the Sector of the Caucasus of the Institute 
of Ethnology and Anthropology at the Russian Academy of Sciences, points out 
the potential pitfalls in Dagestan:  ³Dagestan is the home of fourteen peoples 
mentioned in the ConstitutionŠ. The State CouncilŠis a form of consensus 
democracyŠWhenever a president or, even worse, an appointed governor 
appears there, the question of this ethnic origin will be raised immediately.  It will 
be all right if he is a representative of some small ethnic group.  If however, he 
represents a majority ethnic groupŠall the rest will probably turn to mutiny.² (7) 
 
Thus far, President Putin¹s post-Beslan approach to combating terrorism seems 
to have little to offer, perhaps that¹s because Putin needs answer to no one. 
 
Huh? 
Putin¹s decision to insert himself into the Ukrainian presidential elections are 
perplexing enough, but his comments to the Ukrainian electorate might prove 
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even more confounding.  During a phone-in program for three Ukrainian 
television channels, Putin quoted some verse by the Ukrainian national poet, 
Taras Shevchenko.  Speaking in Ukrainian, Putin waxed, ³The day goes by, the 
night goes by, burying my head in my hands, I keep wondering why the apostle 
of truth and science stays away.²  (8)  He noted that he had found, at the time he 
learned the lines, the verse ³suits me to a tee.²  (9)  That may speak volumes.  
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ³Interview with Chinese newspapersŠ,² Kremlin website via 
(www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2004/10/13/2023_77912.shtml). 
(2) The Moscow Times, 26 Oct 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) RTR Russia TV, Moscow, in Russian 0700 GMT 22 Oct 04; BBC Monitoring 
via Lexis-Nexis.  
(4) Vedomosti, No 197, p.A2; RusData Dialine via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) RIA Novosti, 21 Oct 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) Moscow News, 27 Oct 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(7) Novye Izvestiya, 15 Oct 04; What the Papers Say (WPS) Defense and 
Security 20 Oct 04 via ISI Emerging Markets Database. 
(8) UT1 Kiev, 1700 GMT, 26 Oct 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Database. 
 (9) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Eric Beene 
 
October 11 marked three months since President Putin signed the order 
authorizing the reorganization of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB).  In 
that missive, he gave the FSB Director, Nikolai Patrushev, three months to 
prepare specific proposals for FSB restructuring.  (1) There has been no official 
or leaked word on any such proposals thus far.   This suggests one of two things:  
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Either Patrushev¹s plan is still in the hands of President Putin and is being held in 
such secrecy that no word of it has reached the outside (possible, but unlikely 
given the current climate in Russia); or the Beslan siege in September, in which 
nearly a dozen of the FSB¹s special forces troops were killed, in addition to over 
300 civilians, has altered the timetable for an FSB shakeup.  The latter 
explanation is the more plausible, given the mass of other changes enacted or 
planned by the leadership. 
 
The Beslan siege is bound to have caused reverberations throughout the security 
services on many levels, not just because of the loss of life within the services 
(whose replacements will take time to train), but because it demonstrated the 
inefficacy of the administration¹s Caucasus strategy.  Some journalists have 
reported that the security services themselves drafted a new Chechnya plan, 
which was thought to be unpopular with some in the presidential administration 
and thus was leaked in order to garner support, not an uncommon move.  It 
appears to contain some ³out-of-the-box² thinking, including cooperation with 
Israel on counter-terrorism. The plan reportedly elicited some support in the 
Kremlin, but there has been no formal announcement so far.  (2)  Meanwhile, the 
(Federation Council-led) investigation into the Beslan tragedy continues, with few 
results yet available (or expected).  (3)  With so many new developments and 
diverse responses since August, the plans for an FSB reorganization imagined in 
the relative political calm of July, probably will need more time to emerge.  
 
Still, changes were included in the original decree, namely cutting the number of 
departments from twelve to four; this was largely cosmetic, since many of the 
³cut² departments simply were renamed ³services² and their leaders were left 
untouched.  (4)  On the one hand, the FSB may be the one organization in which 
President Putin, had the most faith, rightly or wrongly, and his siloviki appointees 
are the individuals on whom he most relies.  On the other hand, the FSB may be 
the single most disappointing organization in the Putin administration, a fact 
made especially obvious in the three months since the reform decree was 
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signed.  Although its budget has increased many times in the past four years, the 
FSB¹s ranks are still marred by rampant corruption, and the service seems 
signally incapable of preventing the most horrific acts of terror on Russian soil. 
(5)  Only if Putin has the ability to comprehend the true state of this highly 
publicized service is there the slightest chance of genuine change. 
 
Putin¹s words indicate that he is aware of the problems linked to corruption.  His 
moves to strengthen the ³vertical of power² conceivably might reduce corruption 
at the regional level, by keeping local leaders at the Kremlin¹s mercy, although 
this approach certainly is questionable.  With respect to the security services, 
however, his actions thus far appear to fall short of the mark.  Indeed, the 
Kremlin has raised salaries for cabinet members, but so far there is no word on 
whether the 50-billion ruble FSB budget for 2005 will include increases in the 
salaries of lower-level security service employees, in addition to the plan to 
procure hardware and training.  (6)  Presumably, a better wage would tend to 
reduce corruption, but it is not clear what constitutes an ³honest wage² in the 
Russian security services.  With FSB members allegedly selling fake passports 
for $1500 each, and Interior Ministry members charging upwards of $100,000 to 
close troublesome investigations into major businesses, pure compensation 
alone will not solve the problem of corruption within the security services.  (7) 
 
Nevertheless, the Putin administration continues to rely almost solely on current 
and former FSB personnel, even recycling seemingly spent siloviki.  Putin 
recently announced the appointment of Anatoli Safonov to the newly created post 
of ³presidential special representative for questions of international cooperation in 
the fight against terrorism and transnational organized crime.²  Of late, Colonel-
General Safonov was Ambassador-at-Large and FSB deputy director, but he lost 
his position in a cabinet reshuffle last summer.   Safonov has made a career of 
security service work in the former KGB and FSB, all within the USSR and 
Russia.  Newspaper reports find no distinguishing diplomatic or counter-terrorism 
experience in his background, only the expected tradecraft and cronyism one has 
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come to expect from such appointments in the Putin administration, making 
Safonov another typical Putin apparatchik. In short, Safonov¹s appointment is 
unlikely to provide the impetus necessary to develop a new breed of dependable 
and well-trained soldiers, who can enhance the state¹s security.  (8) 
 
It must be remembered that the security services operate in a grey area of 
statecraft, one that has changed significantly in the past few years, owing not just 
to the breakup of the Soviet Union, but also to the altered strategic landscape 
that recognizes state- and non-state-sponsored terrorists as major players.   And 
while the KGB was especially well trained to do what they did, their goals were 
limited and their methods less circumscribed than they are today.  A good Soviet 
intelligence officer is unlikely ever to have been taken alive following the 
assassination of an insurgent leader, much less captured, tried, and convicted in 
a foreign country as were the two GRU officers in Qatar (following their 
successful car-bombing of Chechen rebel leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev).  And 
while the Kremlin denied any link to the minor damage caused by the fire-
bombing of the London apartment of Maskhadov¹s deputy, Akhmed Zakayev, on 
17 October, the fact that it occurred mere hours after Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov reiterated Russia¹s intention to strike preemptively where the terrorists 
and their supporters live seems more than a coincidence.  (9)  Perhaps the fire 
bombings really were carried out by those seeking retribution for Beslan, as the 
Kremlin suggested; maybe the GRU agents really were acting on their own.  If 
this is the case, then despite the siloviki in the cabinet, there is no control over 
these mechanisms of direct action.   If it is not the case, perhaps there are even 
more unsettling conclusions to draw—perhaps security services have either lost 
a part of their operational expertise, or are still relying on cold war methods 
(typified by a more Machiavellian ends-means relationship) in the new strategic 
landscape.    
 
The larger point is the example Putin is setting for the security services.  By 
maintaining, as his unstated requirement for appointment to an administration 
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leadership position, prior service in the security services, he has created a model 
for the current generation of security service officers—adherence to the values 
that made the KGB so powerful in the USSR: cronyism; strict observation of 
orders from above with little innovation; and a career resume that values simple 
service, not cultural or academic broadening that might provide an enhanced 
perspective of the problems facing the NIS.  The officers he has put into positions 
of leadership are not the best and the brightest, only the most well-known (or 
loyal) to the president.  And there appears little motivation to alter this recipe for 
personal success in the government, at any level. 
 
So, if there is to be any lasting reform, whenever it is discussed openly, one 
would expect the conversation to include corruption proofing measures that 
ultimately will help prevent future attacks by terrorists, aided by those whose job 
is to protect the nation; and command and control measures aimed at helping 
end terrorist incidences rapidly and with minimal loss of life, a shortcoming 
discussed in previous NIS Observed (see archives).  Until President Putin sets a 
higher standard for the upper levels of the administration, do not expect any 
reforms, no matter how well-conceived they may be, to change any of the 
security services¹ fundamental shortcomings.   The FSB-produced Chechnya 
plan appears to be a step in the right direction.  If so, it would be the first.  One 
hopes it is not an aberration. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1)  "Reform of Russia's Federal Security Service, Emergencies Ministry 
Detailed," Vremya novostey, 15 Jul 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-0715 via World News 
Connection. 
(2)  ³Nukes Will Not Be Used,² by Pavel Felgenhauer, The Moscow Times, 19 
Oct 04, JRL #8416. 
(3)  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Newsline Vol. 8, No. 201, Part I, 
22 Oct 04. 
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(4)  ³FSB Reform: Changes Are Few and Far Between,² by Andrei Soldatov, 
Moscow News, 6-12 Oct 04 via Johnson's Russia List (JRL) #9398, 7 Oct 04. 
(5)  "Russian security budget expands during Putin's watch," Agence France 
Presse (AFP), 19 September 04 via Johnson¹s Russia List (JRL), #8374. 
(6)  ³The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review,² Volume IX, Number 15, 29 
September 04. 
(7)  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Newsline, Vol. 8, No. 179, Part I, 
20 September 04 and Ekspert, No. 39, Oct 04 via JRL #8422, 22 Oct 04. 
(8)  ³President Picks Shady Character As Envoy,² by Aleksei Tarasov, Moscow 
News, 20 Oct 2004 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(9)  ³Nukes Will Not Be Used,² by Pavel Felgenhauer, The Moscow Times, 19 
Oct 04, JRL #8416. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Rebecca Mulder 
 
Mission accomplished 
President Putin traveled first to China and then to Tajikistan on a five day tour 
from 14-18 October to discuss bilateral issues between the respective countries. 
Both visits were important occasions in the history of Russian bilateral relations, 
as they brought the leaders together to examine mutual concerns regarding 
economic and security matters in the region. 
 
President Putin¹s meeting with President Hu Jintao in China (14-16 October) 
marked the solidification of a partnership between the two countries that provides 
mutual advantages.  Putin landed with three main objectives: to persuade China 
to give verbal support for Russia¹s membership in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO); to resolve the problem of common borders; and to convince China to 
commit heavy financial investments in Russia. President Jintao hoped to secure 
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approval for a 1,475 kilometer oil link from Siberia to the Chinese port of Daqing. 
(1) 
 
As the world¹s second largest importer of oil (behind the United States), China 
currently suffers from dwindling domestic supplies.  Energy demands are almost 
doubling annually in China, and although Russia currently supplies no gas to the 
People¹s Republic, the head of Russia¹s Gazprom, Aleksei Miller, and China¹s 
National Petroleum company signed a vague agreement that leaves the 
pipeline¹s future uncertain.  China¹s critical energy demands proved a significant 
incentive to invest upwards of $20 billion in Russia by 2020; Jintao also agreed to 
support Moscow¹s bid for WTO membership. (2) Russia¹s entrance into the WTO 
would benefit China greatly, as it should result in a major increase in its 
investments. 
 
The founding agreement of the Russia-China Business Council was signed on 15 
October during its first sitting in Beijing, timed to coincide with the talks between 
Putin and Jintao.  The Council will become a tool for the strengthening of 
economic cooperation and its main goal ³will be to ensure immediate access for 
businessmen in the two countries to information on different projects in them,² 
stated Andrei Kazmin, chairman of the board of Sberbank (Savings Bank). (3) 
Thirteen subcommittees, including banking, have been set up through the 
council. 
 
Concerning border issues, which have been a longstanding dispute, Putin and 
Jintao agreed that their adjoining border will be legally registered and marked 
out, a first in the history of Russian-Chinese relations. According to President 
Putin, this decision creates opportunities for closer cooperation in developing 
shipping, nature management, protection of the environment and farming. (4) 
President Jintao declared, ³From this moment on, the Chinese-Russian border, 
an extent of over 3,400km, will be a bond of friendship and cooperation between 
our peoples.² (5) 
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It seems new frontiers have been opened for the two countries by this border 
resolution. Overall, President Putin achieved his objectives during his visit. This 
latest meeting with President Jintao, the one that occurred last month in Russia, 
and the decision to make 2006 the Year of Russia in China, and 2007 the Year of 
China in Russia, (6) all suggest a growing partnership that will make agreements, 
especially in the realm of security, more likely. 
 
Putin spoke of positive dynamics and the beneficial prospects of strong bilateral 
relations as he opened talks in Dushanbe with Tajik President Emomali 
Rakhmonov.  Putin¹s sojourn to Tajikistan showcased the successful completion 
of agreements that would help solve the problem of Tajikistan¹s debt to Russia 
and bind the two countries in a fight against drug trafficking from Afghanistan.  
 
Russia will invest a total of $2 billion in the Tajik economy within the next five 
years, an investment that Putin believes will pay off as Tajikistan regains stability. 
It also stands as a sign that Russia views political developments as hopeful and 
that mutual confidence is building. (7) This bilateral economic partnership rests 
on lucrative investments that hopefully will lead to economic progress throughout 
the entire region. Showing support for the economic partnership, but not wanting 
to alienate other investors, President Rakhmonov stated, ³We assign priority to 
Russian partners, however, the interests of foreign investors in Tajikistan keeps 
growing.² (8) 
 
The military-political sphere of Russian-Tajik relations is probably the most 
important development to note, as the respective leaders signed four new military 
agreements that will allow for the largest Russian military base abroad to be 
established, with over 20,000 servicemen. (9) Russia will waive tuition and begin 
training Tajik soldiers next year as a part of the agreements, as well. (10) This 
base is supposed to promote not only the security of Tajikistan but greater 
regional and European security, as Tajikistan becomes a ³buffer to protect 
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Europe and other regions from terrorism, extremism and drugs.² (11) This move 
by Russia to establish a large military presence in the region is yet another 
consequence of the Beslan attacks. Rakhmonov stated, ³The recent terrorist acts 
in Russia, above all, the tragedy in Beslan have shown the danger of terrorism. 
We are ready to join all efforts to prevent terrorist acts and to punish those who 
perform them.² (12) Russia likely is pleased to have another partner in the war on 
terror, but this also appears to be a useful instrument through which to assert his 
power within the Central Asian–former Soviet–territories. 
 
Project Iran 
As worldwide debates continue on what to do with Iran¹s nuclear program, 
Russia has voiced again its desire to see Iran settle all remaining questions on its 
transparency and character.  The Russian Foreign Ministry¹s Information and 
Press Department commented during a recent G-8 meeting in Washington: ³We 
are speaking in favor of switching the agency¹s control functions onto a normal 
track, similar to that of most member states of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons.² (13) Russia favors diplomatic means in dealing with Iran 
as the November IAEA Board of Governors session approaches, and further 
calls on Iran to ³suspend the enrichment and processing of nuclear materials as 
a confidence building measure.² (14) According to Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov, what Iran should do is ratify the Additional Protocol on IAEA 
Guarantees; he also encouraged Iran to enforce a moratorium on the enrichment 
of uranium. (15) 
 
As to the Bushehr nuclear power plant project, Lavrov firmly stated that ³it is not 
an IAEA concern and therefore Russia will go on in cooperating with Iran in 
[constructing] the site.² (16)  He noted that what the parties involved have yet to 
do is sign protocols on the supplies of Russian-made nuclear fuel to Iran and on 
the return of the nuclear waste back to Russia. IAEA experts are in the process 
of preparing their report for the November 25 meeting; certainly the Bushehr site 
and the depth of Russia¹s involvement in Iran¹s nuclear program will be 
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discussed.  This relationship between Iran and Russia continues to have the 
world¹s attention, as Iran remains a strategic ally for Russia in the Middle East, 
and the nuclear potential of Iran poses concerns, for many, particularly the U.S. 
and Israel. 
 
An interesting energy development on the horizon that involves Russia, Iran and 
Azerbaijan is the possible synchronization of their respective energy systems. 
Anatoli Chubais, on an official visit to Azerbaijan, said that ³Azerbaijan is 
interested in the expansion of energy contacts with Iran and boosting contacts 
with RussiaŠIf the talks confirm the technical possibility for broadening the zone, 
this decision will be a breakthrough to expanding the integrated synchronized 
zone with the centre in Moscow.² (17) Should this happen, this would be an 
unprecedented synchronized energy system that would secure Russia¹s 
interdependence with Iran and likely mark a blow for Azerbaijani independence. 
 
Overall, Russia is seeking to propagate stronger bilateral relations with countries 
that have strategic importance. Economic, security and energy issues 
inextricably tie these regions together. How Putin uses these ties to enhance his 
regional and global objectives will demonstrate his commitment to advancing the 
well-being and stability of the regions at large, as well as his commitment to 
increasing his own strategic power, both at home and abroad. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Moscow News, 22 Oct 04 via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) RIA-Novosti, 15 Oct 04; 
file://localhost/(http/::en.rian.ru:rian:index.cfm%3Fprd_id=160&date=2004-10-15). 
(4) Kremlin.ru, 15 Oct 04; 
(http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2004/10/15/1328_78017.shtml). 
(5) Ibid. 
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(6) Ibid. 
(7) RIA-Novosti, 16 Oct 04; 
file://localhost/(http/::en.rian.ru:rian:index.cfm%3Fprd_id=160&date=2004-10-16). 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) Ibid. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) RIA-Novosti, 18 Oct 04; 
(http://en.rian.ru/rian/index.cfm?prd_id=160&date=2004-10-18). 
(14) Ibid. 
(15) RIA Novosti, 17 Oct 04; 
(http://en.rian.ru/rian/index.cfm?prd_id=160&date=2004-10-17). 
(16) Ibid. 
(17) RIA Novosti, 20 Oct 04; 
(http://en.rian.ru/rian/index.cfm?prd_id=160&date=2004-10-20). 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 
Reforms and United Russia – Doomsday or the chance of a lifetime? 
With Vladimir Putin taking long strides toward changes in Russia¹s government – 
he has proposed alterations affecting the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches – an examination of the effect of those moves on the Kremlin-favored 
United Russia political party seems in order. To summarize the primary steps 
under discussion: 1) the elimination of the direct election of governors, replacing 
it with presidential nomination and confirmation by the regional legislature; 2) the 
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elimination of single-member parliamentary constituencies, confining elections to 
party lists, with seats allocated by proportional representation; 3) the 
restructuring of the Supreme Qualification Collegium, reducing its numbers and 
splitting the power of appointment between an emasculated Federation Council 
and the president.  The Supreme Qualification Collegium, which has oversight of 
judges and authorizes new judicial bodies, was the subject of an earlier ³reform² 
attempt under Dmitri Kozak¹s judicial reform package.  Clearly, previous efforts to 
insert presidential appointees failed. 
 
In recent coverage, there have been two primary, and quite divergent, opinions 
expressed about United Russia: The first is that it is in decline or, at the very 
least, seriously challenged by other political parties. (1)  The second is that 
United Russia is poised to become the dominant party in Russia, much as the 
Communist Party was in the Soviet Union. (2) 
 
Putin¹s changes will affect United Russia¹s power and composition in a number 
of ways. There have been some forecasts that the recently proposed bill 
legalizing party membership for ministers may push most ministers to join the 
³party of power.² (3) Others allege that Putin¹s recently initiated reforms simply 
formalize a shift toward regional politics that has been under way for the better 
part of this year. (4) 
 
Tensions erupted over the details of electoral reform at a recent conference. The 
Central Electoral Commission favors mandating the presence of at least four 
parties in the Duma. (5) United Russia opposes the suggestion, theoretically on 
the basis that it could lead to a party that has not earned the requisite share of 
the vote being allowed to have members in the Duma (if not enough parties pass 
the seven percent mark). This objection makes sense if United Russia expects to 
acquire a high percentage of the vote. In that case, United Russia would be 
forced to yield some of its votes to parties who legally were not supposed to be in 
the legislature. 
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United Russia has supported the proposed reforms calling for proportional 
elections to the Duma. On the one hand, United Russia¹s support for the reforms 
is consistent given the party¹s close relationship with Putin. On the other hand, 
based on the last election, the reforms could injure United Russia¹s standing 
within the Duma. According to some accounts, United Russia earned more seats 
based on the current electoral system than it would have, if the newly proposed 
laws had been in place. (6) United Russia¹s support could be a form of rational 
self interest if the party anticipates increased membership and electoral backing 
based on Putin¹s other reforms. The decision to replace the direct election of 
governors with presidential nomination and legislative confirmation has 
encouraged regional leaders to join the Kremlin-favored party. However, the shift 
to proportional elections theoretically could injure United Russia¹s presence in 
the federal legislature until it proves its ability to garner more of the vote.  
 
Although fears of a return to one-party government have surfaced often in 
Russia¹s media coverage of late, the possibility seems somewhat more remote 
than is suggested.  
 
Peace with unease in Ingushetia and North Ossetia 
It is a prevalent belief in North Ossetia that there were Ingush among the 
hostage-takers at Beslan. This belief, as yet unconfirmed, certainly does not help 
the already tense relations between Ingushetia and North Ossetia, which are the 
by-product, in part, of the 1992 five day war between them. Some members of 
the government, however, are attempting to address Ingush-North Ossetian 
relations before conflict breaks out again. 
 
The People's Assembly of the Republic of Ingushetia sent an appeal to the 
parliament of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania on (or about) 12 October, at 
the end of the official 40 day Orthodox mourning period over Beslan. 
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The appeal asked three main questions. First, ³do you not believe that Ossetians 
and Ingush found themselves in the path of essentially the same criminal 
groups?Š  Second, do you agree that behind the various publications and 
contradictory statements by individuals in the media, a kind of psychological and 
ideological climate is being developed that is trying to justify new tragedies for 
our peoples? And should we not take into account, too, that there are certain 
forces in Russia and beyond its borders who have a vested interest in the 
destabilization of the Caucasus, and, in particular, are using a conflict between 
the people of Ingushetia and Ossetia for their own political and financial 
interests? ThirdŠ does it not seem to you, esteemed parliamentarians, that it is 
the duty and obligation of elected representatives to stand above such private 
feelings and impulses for the sake of common and neighbourly interests?² (7) 
 
While incorporating a certain amount of conspiracy theory (though perhaps not 
unjustly – Russia has a history of using tension between ethnic groups as a 
means of maintaining its own influence), the fact that an overture is being made 
on the level of regional parliaments gives at least a token of hope that 
cooperation between the two regional governments could help address the 
residual issues in the area. The North Ossetian parliament Council is currently 
discussing whether to submit the Ingush appeal to debate on 28 October. (8)  
This screening appears more wary than this (probable) olive branch deserves; 
however, one member of the North Ossetian parliament expressed annoyance at 
the fact that the appeal appeared on the Internet before it arrived at his 
workplace. Perhaps he suspects that the document¹s purpose is more 
propaganda than regional cooperation. 
 
Meanwhile, security seems to be on everyone¹s mind. Police and other troops 
are a concrete presence in North Ossetia, (9)  and Ingushetia is reinforcing its 
border posts. (10) 
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The federal response to a potential Ingush-North Ossetian conflict remains 
unclear. President Putin fired his special representative for settlement of the 
Ossetian-Ingush conflict on 7 October. He also signed a decree to advance the 
work of federal bodies on relations between the two regions. (11)  Most of Putin¹s 
response to the Beslan crisis, however, seems to have been directed at political 
reform and threatening speeches about terrorists rather than concrete actions 
toward prosecuting those responsible for Beslan. A strong assurance by the 
government (and visible actions) that it is exacting justice may be the response 
required to prevent those affected by the attack from taking justice into their own 
hands. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1)  ³Rodina¹s challenge begins to bite,² Moscow Times, 15 Oct 04 via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(2)  ³Party membership card number one,² Itogi, 12 Oct 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) ³Russian reform raises spectre of ŒThe Party,¹² Reuters, 13 Oct 04 via 
Johnson¹s Russia List (JRL) #8408, 14 Oct 04. 
(4) ³Russian parties' increasing interest in regional legislative assemblies 
viewed,² Moscow Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 Oct 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1008 via 
World News Connection. 
(5) ³A two-party Duma,² Nezavisimaya gazeta, 5 Oct 04 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(6) ³Power vertical: A double-edged sword,² Argumenty i fakty, September 04 via 
JRL #8379, 24 September 04. 
(7) ³MPs in Russia's Ingushetia say conflict with North Ossetia must be 
prevented,² BBC Monitoring, 12 Oct 04 via JRL #8408, 14 Oct 04.  
(8) ³Russian daily reports on Beslan commission, threats against Ingush,² 
Moscow Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 Oct 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1014 via World News 
Connection. 
(9) Ibid. 
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(10) ³Ingush Interior Ministry working to prevent unrest in North Caucasus,² 
Interfax, 13 Oct 04; FBIS-SOV-2004-1013 via World News Connection. 
(11) ³Putin fires representative for North Ossetia, Ingushetia,² Interfax, 7 Oct 04; 
FBIS-SOV-2004-1007 via World News Connection. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Jeff Kubiak and Kyle Colton 
 
INTERNAL 
The Russian Federation Defense Ministry has released the specifics regarding 
the (leaked) plan to cut 100,000 active troops from the armed forces.  In 
surprising detail, an article in Kommersant on 11 October outlined exactly which 
units will bear the brunt of this latest force reduction.  Although ³noncombatant² 
personnel such as club managers, sportsmen, builders and instructors were easy 
targets, these totaled only 40,000-45,000.  Many of the cuts appear to be an 
accounting ³smoke and mirrors² play, because they simply transfer responsibility 
for tasks from the Defense Ministry to other organizations (like transferring the 
responsibility for storing decommissioned nuclear submarines from the Navy to 
the Federal Nuclear Agency); it is, nonetheless, obvious that the military would 
need to find real ways to reduce its manpower requirements.  At the macro level, 
it appears that the Air Force (cutting 36,000 of their 180,000, or 20%), military 
construction units (cutting 9,000 troops, or 15%), and the Navy (cutting 17,000 of 
their 171,000, or 10%) are the big losers.  The railroad troops will lose their 
independence, and after cutting 2,000 troops, will be moved to the rear forces of 
the army.  The Strategic Rocket Forces will cut 3,000 of its 149,000 troops and 
will re-organize to afford more efficiency.  The Space Forces lose only 1,000 
billets and are forced to make no major structural changes.  The Ground Forces 
will cut 20,000 soldiers (only about 2%), nearly 8,000 of them are instructors, 
who lost positions in the merger of several army educational institutes.  
Additionally, a number of the cuts will come by reducing redundancies in 
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headquarters staff positions.  This will be accomplished through a 10% cut 
across the range of administrative structures. (1) 
 
An article in Nezavisimaya gazeta cited ³authorized sources in the Air Force² as 
having ³candidly stated that they never anticipated that the Air Force would be 
subjected to another cutŠ.² (2)  The Air Force loses nearly 175 fixed-wing 
aircraft, more than 100 of which are third and fourth generation fighters, along 
with 20 long-range Backfire bombers.  They will also close numerous Mi-8MT 
and Mi-24 helicopter squadrons; (3)  after years of thin defense budgets, the 
operational capability of many of these aircraft, and the readiness of their pilots 
certainly are suspect.  Maintenance has not been kept up and modifications are 
behind schedule on many of the airframes.  Pilots have been leaving the Air 
Force in droves. (4)  However, while the Air Force¹s strike and air defense units 
have been reduced dramatically, it is interesting to note that not one 
airlift/transportation unit suffered any cuts.  This is very much in line with Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov¹s desire to have highly mobile, permanently ready 
professional forces capable of being deployed to a conflict area on short notice.  
Those troops will need aircraft to get them from their garrison location to the 
action. 
 
Although losing nearly 10% of its authorized manning, the very expensive force 
structure of the Navy suffers little in the way of substantial cuts.  Nearly all of the 
personnel cuts will be accomplished through the transfer of several functions to 
other civilian agencies, similar to the transfer mentioned above regarding 
decommissioned nuclear submarines.  There was no mention at all about any 
further cuts in the Russian surface fleet, a fleet that appears to be in a very poor 
state of readiness, according to the report summarizing the investigation into the 
sinking of the Kursk. (5)  The absence of surface ships on the list of force 
structure reductions seems to fall outside of the security strategy being followed 
by Ivanov and the Defense Ministry.  It is difficult to see exactly how Russia¹s 
current fleet of nearly 200 surface warships (including cruisers, destroyers, 
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frigates, battle cruisers and an aircraft carrier) fits Ivanov¹s concept of how best 
to meet Russia¹s existing threats. (6)  The only boats mentioned for retirement in 
this round of force reductions are nuclear missile launching submarines.  The 
strategic nuclear forces are central to the deterrence that Russia is counting on 
to maintain security while the armed forces continue to reform into a viable 
fighting force capable of defending against a large scale attack.  These cuts only 
make sense in light of the fact that the boats already lack operational readiness 
due to old age and neglect.  The Project 667BDR (Delta 3) submarines were 
originally slated to leave service in 2003.  Currently, nearly all of them are 
restricted to harbor cruises due to their lack of seaworthiness. (7)  They will be 
retired by 1 January, 2005.  The Project 941 (Akula, or Typhoon as it is known in 
the West) inventory will be cut in half, leaving only two operational and only one 
that is, reportedly, capable of firing missiles. (8)  The Project 667BDRM (Delta 4) 
submarines, operated only by the Northern Fleet, were not cut and continue to 
make up the heart of the Russian nuclear missile launching fleet. (9) 
 
Evidently, the Defense Ministry is trying desperately to cut costs in order to press 
ahead with modernization efforts that have languished due to lack of financing, 
negligence and engineering failures.  The keel of the first of Russia¹s next 
generation nuclear missile launching submarine, the project 955 (Borei), was laid 
in November of 1996, but will not launch until late 2005, and will not become 
operational for two years after that.  There are plans to have three of these subs 
completed by 2010.  When the Borei does become operational, it should be 
equipped with 12 of the new Bulava (MACE)-30 missiles, which are currently 
undergoing testing. (10) 
 
The same basic strategy of eliminating expired weapons as a cost saving 
measure to fund modernization is being used with the Strategic Rocket Forces as 
well.  An entire missile division is being retired or dispersed to other units to 
replace systems already past their life expectancy. (11)  Savings also will be 
realized by lowering the alert levels of selected units.  Specific regiments will 
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absorb personnel cuts and then, instead of being ready for action at any moment, 
will have delays built in, as they take from several hours to several days to 
become ready.  Other SMF units will simply become storage bases for missiles. 
(12)  As with the nuclear submarines, these cuts are necessary to make 
budgetary room for the modernization of the SMF.  The budget for 2005 includes 
money for another regiment, 6 missiles, and the newest ICBM, the Topol-M (SS-
27 is its Western designation). (13) 
 
The Ground Forces see virtually no cuts.  In addition to the military instructors 
already mentioned, most other reductions in troop strength are simple accounting 
functions.  The only unit specifically named for reduction is the 98th Airborne 
Troop Division, which will be reorganized as a brigade in line with Ivanov¹s 
organizational concepts. (14)  The Ground Troops also announced that its new, 
all-professional peacekeeping brigade would be formed in the Volga-Urals district 
near Samara, which is close to the military staging airfield of Kryazh. (15)  This 
announcement also reflects a freedom to act that Ivanov apparently now has, 
which he did not have prior to Kvashnin¹s departure.  The stationing of this 
brigade was an issue on which the Defense Ministry and the General Staff had 
disagreed; Kvashnin advocated moving the brigade to Kartaly as the most 
suitable location.  It is true that the Kryazh airfield¹s proposed receipt of the 
Russia¹s Il-76MD transport aircraft make it an ideal location. (16) 
 
Despite the absence of a detailed study identifying the appropriate force structure 
to meet the current threat, Ivanov is intent on re-sizing the Russian military and 
achieving enough economy to modernize and professionalize the force.  The 
announced cuts are aimed at the most expensive aspects of the defense 
ministry; the Air Force, nuclear submarines, and the officer corps (the current 
troop reduction plan also calls for writing off 5,000 generals and other officers 
who wear the uniform of the Russian Federation armed forces but serve in 
organizations outside of the military). (17)  Some sources indicate that the 
Defense Ministry is not hiding the fact that there are more cuts to come. (18)  
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These recent moves seem to confirm that Ivanov has wrested enough power 
away from the General Staff and services to affect real change, decisively 
moving away from the old force structure paradigms of the Cold War.  This is 
evident especially in the massive cuts in the Air Force.  Rumors also abound 
within the military departments that Ivanov in his sights has up to 80 more 
generals, Kvashnin cronies, target for removal. (19)  Now in more control than 
ever, Ivanov likely will initiate more significant changes in the shape and size of 
the armed forces in the near future as he continues an aggressive, if frustrating, 
path towards creating an effective Russian military.  With the current emphasis 
placed on modernization and acquisition of new armaments, expect future 
Defense Ministry initiatives aimed at gaining increased control over the military 
industrial base.  
 
Tremendous obstacles still must be addressed before the Russian military pulls 
itself out of collapse.  Problems with quality and quantity of the conscripted force, 
the persistence of the destructive culture of hazing, crime, and corruption that 
characterize the Russian military, and the faltering transition to a professional 
force all must be addressed.  Lots of work lies ahead and it may continue to be 
extremely slow going. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) ³Minus 100,000,² Kommersant, 11 Oct 04; What the Papers Say via ISI 
Emerging Markets and Jane¹s Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and The 
CIS from (www4.janes.com). 
(2) ³Russia to Make Further Cuts in Military,² Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12 Oct 04; 
FBIS-SOV-2004-1012 via World News Connection. 
(3) ³Minus 100,000,² Kommersant, 11 Oct 04; What the Papers Say via ISI 
Emerging Markets. 
(4) Jane¹s Sentinel Security Assessment – Russia and The CIS – Air Force, from 
(www4.janes.com) posted 15 Jun 04. 
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(www4.janes.com) posted 03 Jun 03. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) ³Newspaper Lists Shortcomings of Russian Navy¹s Nuclear Submarine Fleet,² 
Rossiyskaya gazeta, 29 Jul 04; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(8) Ibid and ³Minus 100,000,² Kommersant, 11 Oct 04; What the Papers Say via 
ISI Emerging Markets. 
(9) Ibid. 
(10) ³Russia¹s New Nuclear Mace,² RIA Novosti, 29 September 04 via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(11) ³Minus 100,000,² Kommersant, 11 Oct 04; What the Papers Say via ISI 
Emerging Markets. 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) ³Russia¹s 2005 Defense Budget Grows, Becomes More Open,² Stana.ru 
website, 28 September 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(14) ³Minus 100,000,² Kommersant, 11 Oct 04; What the Papers Say via ISI 
Emerging Markets. 
(15) ³Newspaper Reveals Location of First Russian Peacekeeping Brigade,² 
Kommersant, 18 Oct 04;  BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(16) Ibid. 
(17) ³Russia to Make Further Cuts in Military,² Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12 Oct 04; 
FBIS-SOV-2004-1012 via World News Connection. 
(18) Stana.ru web site, 14 Oct 04; BBC Monitoring via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(19) ³Russia to Make Further Cuts in Military,² Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12 Oct 04; 
FBIS-SOV-2004-1012 via World News Connection. 
 
EXTERNAL 
NATO-Russia Council: prospects for cooperation 
NATO and Russian defense ministers held an informal session of the NATO-
Russia Council in Romania on October 14.  While Russian Defense Minister 
Sergei Ivanov chose this opportunity to highlight Russia's views of the failures of 
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the Council, he ignored the Council's accomplishments within its very limited 
mission. According to a NATO press release after the Rome Summit in May 
2002, the NATO-Russia Council was designed to provide a mechanism for 
consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision making, and joint 
action for the member states of NATO and Russia on a wide spectrum of security 
issues in the Euro-Atlantic region.  Additionally, the NATO-Russia Council would 
serve as the principal structure and venue for advancing the relationship between 
the two former antagonists. (1) 
 
The creation of the Council seemed like a new start for Cold War foes and a way 
for NATO and Russia to work together to address 21st century security 
challenges.   Many defense leaders publicly were optimistic about the fledgling 
relationship: "We want to build a culture of cooperation," said Aleksandr 
Alekseyev, one of Russia's envoys to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2)  
"It is a mark of the political will underpinning the new NATO-Russia relationship 
that we have been able to get down to real business so quickly and so 
effectively," said then-NATO Secretary General George Robertson. (3) 
 
"We are confronted with very serious threats to our security," Russian Minister 
Sergei Ivanov said. "Those threats need to be combated with very different tools 
than those used during the Cold War." (4) 
 
While the NATO press releases were joint statements, NATO¹s and Russia¹s 
perceptions of the Council were never the same.  Russia viewed the Council as a 
way to give Moscow a voice in NATO decisions on such issues as terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control, crisis management 
and military cooperation.  NATO saw the Council as a confidence-building 
measure, a way to assure the Russians that they have nothing to fear from 
NATO or NATO expansion. 
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Despite the differences, two weeks after the new council was established, Russia 
and NATO agreed on a joint defense regime.  The package included increasing 
cooperation on countering terrorism specifically for NATO peacekeepers in the 
Balkans, conducting a joint assessment of terrorist threats to airliners, nuclear 
power plants and other civilian and military targets, and preventing the spread of 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. 
 
Quick start followed by little operational unity 
The NATO-Russia Council¹s quick start did not lead to the development of a 
highly useful or productive military relationship.  Distrust, fueled by deeply 
ingrained Cold War mentalities and differing expectations, froze the Council in its 
immature and initial state.    
 
NATO¹s and Russia¹s expectations of the Council appear to have been as 
different as their perceptions of its mission. The U.S. Ambassador to Russia, 
Alexander Vershbow, represented the NATO expectation saying, "We should 
think big for the long term but move step by step in the short term."  "For the first 
phase,² Vershbow added, "it is better to have a concrete list of modest goals to 
avoid being disappointed." (5)  
 
Russia¹s view of the limited scope and slow progress of the Council can be 
summed up by the deputy head of the Moscow-based Institute for Applied 
International Research, Andrei Zagorsky, who said, "What is most worrying is the 
lack of any real military cooperation" between Russia and NATO. (6)  Aleksei 
Arbatov, Deputy Head of the State Duma's Defense Committee, agreed, saying 
that the much-heralded improvement in NATO-Russia relations had been mostly 
hype. (7)  "New relations with NATO are contained to high-level summits and 
meetings, while common programs are rare and lack interest," Arbatov said. (8) 
 
The Council has worked slowly, but a few successes have been achieved over 
its two- year history.  The Council has: 
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• Launched a military-to-military interoperability program to allow Russian 
and NATO troops to operate jointly.  This program led to a fairly 
aggressive 2004 schedule of 21 joint exercises, including eight conducted 
within Russia; (9) 
• Conducted civil emergency exercises in Russia.  With the intended goal of 
developing a multinational rapid deployment capability for civil 
emergencies, exercises have been conducted including a chemical attack 
exercise in September 2002 and a nuclear attack exercise in 2004.  A 
large-scale civil-emergency planning exercise (850 participants from 30 
countries) was completed in Noginsk, Russia. The NRC is currently 
studying lessons learned; (10) 
• Completed joint assessments of terrorist threats to the Euro-Atlantic Area, 
including al-Qaida, and the threat of chemical and biological weapons 
from non-state actors; (11) 
• Cooperated on submarine search and rescue, including actual exercises 
conducted earlier this year; (12) 
• Conducted a Joint Theater Missile Defense Command Post Exercise in 
Colorado Springs in March 2004; (13) 
• Agreed to Russia participating in Operation Active Endeavor, NATO's anti-
terrorist naval operations in the Mediterranean. (14)    
 
Overcoming distrust 
In the opinion of Vadim Razumovsky, Director of the Institute of Applied 
International Studies, the most important goal of the NATO-Russia Council is to 
overcome mutual distrust in relations, however, overcoming distrust has proven 
to be very difficult. (15) 
 
Current Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Yuri Baluyevskiy, wrote in 
April 2003, ³despite the transformations that have occurred in the North Atlantic 
alliance under the impact of the dynamic changes of the past decade and its own 
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so-called modernization, it has remained, basically, a military bloc.² (16)  He 
wrote in the same article, ³it is still our view that the decision on NATO 
enlargement is erroneous. It will have a negative impact on the general security 
architecture in Europe, affecting the security interests of a number of states, 
including Russia's.² (17) 
 
Russia and NATO conducted their first ever joint naval maneuvers in the Atlantic 
Ocean in August of 2004.  Just days prior to the exercise, Admiral Vladimir 
Valuyev, Commander of the Baltic Fleet, commented on Russian television, 
"Every nation, including Russia, must seek to strengthen its armed forces and its 
navy. It will come in useful. If NATO behaves peacefully, we'll stick to peacetime 
tasks. If, however, the situation is escalated, we'll always be ready to take 
appropriate action." (18) 
 
General Baluyevskiy and Admiral Valuyev are primary players in the Russian 
military.  Their rhetoric reflects a deeply ingrained view within Russian military 
circles that continues to portray NATO as the enemy.  Their assessment of the 
threats faced by the Russian Federation does not take into account the 
rapprochement between NATO and Russia, nor does it adequately convey our 
shared 21st century threat environment.  NATO's view is that each successfully 
conducted joint exercise will continue to erode the "NATO is the enemy" view, 
especially in the junior officers. 
 
Conclusion 
NATO will continue to view the NATO-Russia Council as a confidence-building 
device more than as a useful institution in itself. The council¹s mandate 
deliberately has been circumscribed to help ensure that its functioning 
corresponds to Russia's own readiness to cooperate productively with NATO.  
Russia has yet to prove itself a reliable or constructive partner in operational 
matters.   Practical cooperation in the operational environment has not increased 
over the past two years, however Russia and NATO have found some common 
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ground and numerous exercises have been completed.  While the current 
relationship seems much less than Russia originally wanted from NATO, the 
council does serve as a communications conduit – even if it is currently reserved 
primarily for exercise development and political propaganda.  Taking the long 
view, the council has achieved its limited goal of maintaining a working 
relationship with Russian diplomats while establishing contacts with the next 
generation of Russian military officers. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) (www.nato.int). 
(2) "Insiders Question if NATO-Russia Bonding is Little More Than Hype,² 8 Dec 
02 via (www.eng.yabloko.ru). 
(3) "NATO-Russia Meeting Follows on Heels of Deal," The Associated Press, 7 
Jun 02 via (www.sptimes.ru). 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) "Insiders question if NATO-Russia bonding is little more than hype," 8 Dec 02 
via (www.eng.yabloko.ru). 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) Ibid. 
(9) (www.whitehouse.gov). 
(10) (www.state.gov). 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) (www.whitehouse.gov). 
(13) Ibid. 
(14) Ibid. 
(15) Parlamentskaya gazeta, 11 Dec 02 via (www.wps.ru/e_index.html). 
(16) Military Thought, March-April 2003 via (www.findarticles.com). 
(17) Military Thought, March-April 2003 via (www.findarticles.com). 
 30 
(18) NTV, Mir, 7 Aug 2004 via Eurasia Daily Monitor (Jamestown) Volume 1, 
Issue 70 10 Aug 04. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Elena Selyuk 
 
ELECTIONS INŠ 
Moldova 
2005 will be the year for parliamentary elections in Moldova. There are already 
fears that the elections will be jeopardized, however, by the current government¹s 
harassment of the political opposition, intimidation of local authorities, especially 
non-Communist mayors, and attempts to control the media. ³The representatives 
of the prosecutors, police and the center for combating economic crimes and 
corruption are monitoring the activities of mayors and are making groundless 
accusations against them. We are now facing the same situation, which prevailed 
ahead of the 2003 local elections,² said Vasil Balan, the chairman of The 
National League of Association of Mayors of Moldova. (1) This month, a project 
called ³Electoral Impact on Good Governance² was launched in the country. The 
project is designed to support free elections through the local press. The project 
is funded by the U.S. Embassy in Moldova, the Eurasia Foundation, the National 
Endowment for Democracy and the OSCE Mission to Moldova. The project will 
be implemented by the Media Impact Agency in cooperation with 16 TV stations 
and several radio stations, which will broadcast debates and feature programs on 
various elections topics. (2) 
 
Ukraine 
There are growing fears of the possibility of massive disturbances in various 
parts of Ukraine, both before and after the presidential elections, due to the 
authorities¹ pressure tactics applied against the population, mass media and the 
opposition, as well as their possible falsification of the election results. There is 
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even speculation that the military parade in Kiev, which is to take place on 28 
October and which is dedicated to the 60th anniversary of Ukraine¹s liberation 
from Nazi Germany, is an excuse to bring troops into the center of Kiev and 
introduce a state of emergency. (3) The MVD currently is training for possible 
mass protests and assures the populace that ³methods of suppression of the 
actions of protest will not be harmful to peoples¹ health and are even approved 
by the Ukrainian Ministry of Health.² (!) (4) 
 
Some pro-Yanukovich press and current Ukrainian authorities are contemplating 
the possibility of Yushchenko¹s organizing a ³chestnut revolution² in Ukraine. 
According to Yushchenko¹s alleged plan, the revolt, which is to take place next to 
the Ukrainian Central Electoral Commission building, will begin right after the 
elections, the night of 31 October to 1 November.  The storming of the 
presidential administration is, supposedly, the first step. (5) Whether or not such 
a scenario is planned or realized, the larger issue of electoral fraud and the 
legitimacy of the results possibly rending Ukraine between Western and Eastern 
Sections is a concern. No matter who wins, each candidate has strong enough 
support to cause major disturbances in the country, which might even be enough 
to start a civil war. 
 
BelarusŠ 
Elections results 
The announcement that Lukashenko ³won² the right to run for a third term with 
79.42 percent of the vote came as no surprise in Belarus. As the referendum 
vote became public, so did the results of the independent poll conducted by the 
Gallup Organization/Baltic Surveys, which found that only 48.3 percent of the 
voters approved Lukashenko¹s running for a third term, which is short of the 50 
percent requirement. (6) As for the parliamentary elections results, not a single 
candidate from the opposition managed to obtain a seat in the lower house of 
parliament. 
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During the pre-election campaign, opposition candidates were allowed to spend 
only $440 per person, which was just about enough for 25,000 leaflets. (7) TV 
debates were limited to 5-minute pre-recorded messages from the opposition 
candidates. Often, door-to-door campaigning was the only way to reach voters. 
(8) Closures of newspapers, raids on the apartments of opposition party leaders, 
numerous arrests and intimidation, in general, of opposition leaders, and finally 
an outrageous falsification of the elections results led to this inevitable loss for 
the Belarusian opposition. 
 
Falsifications 
Numerous violations of international norms haunt these parliamentary elections 
and the referendum. The most compelling evidence was obtained by the leader 
of the United Civic Party Anatoli Lebed¹ko, who took photographs that showed a 
pile of ballots with the ³Yes² column already marked off. (9) These ballots were 
given out to the elderly, who came to vote before the election date. Many voters 
testified that when they arrived at the polling, their names simply were not 
included in the lists. In one of the apartment buildings in Minsk, residents of 
fifteen apartments were missing from the voter lists. (10) In one village, a voter 
was given the passport of his neighbor, who died several years ago, and was 
ordered to vote using this document. Numerous instances where voters were 
given 2-3 ballots per person were also common. (11) No wonder turnout at the 
majority of polling stations in Minsk exceeded 100 percent, according to the 
United Civic Party report. (12) Information that election stations were not locked 
up for the night came from independent observers, says the Charter97 website. 
Representatives of the ³law guarding² organs allegedly were present at the 
polling stations at night, which is in direct contradiction to electoral law. At some 
polling stations, seals on voting boxes were damaged. (13) Election committee 
members carried on despite such outright violations of election norms – of course 
they were paid twice their daily salary for their work on elections day. (14) 
 
Aftermath 
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Every day since the announcement of the elections and referendum results, 
protests have taken place in Minsk. More than five thousand protesters went out 
onto the streets on 18 October. The protesters, who carried placards reading: 
³Lukashenko Lost!², ³Victory!², ³No!² and ³Down with Lukashenko!², demanded 
Lukashenko¹s resignation and the cancellation of the parliamentary elections 
results. (15) The militia hemmed in the crowd, not allowing the protestors to 
move along roads that lead to Lukashenko¹s administration building. More than 
60 people have been arrested and jailed since the protests began. 
 
International reaction to the elections 
Both the United States and European Union expressed sharp criticism of the 
elections in Belarus. George Bush signed the ³Belarus Democracy Act² on 20 
October, which calls for sanctions against Belarus should the Belarusian 
authorities continue to persecute the opposition and the media, refuse 
investigations into those who have ³disappeared² for political reasons, etc. This 
document has serious consequences for the Belarusian authorities, such as 
restrictions on travel to the United States and a reduction of financial aid from 
international financial institutions. (16) The European Union expressed deep 
concerns about Lukashenko¹s use of violence against the opposition and called 
the situation in Belarus a process of ³further self-isolation.² (17) 
 
Russia and the CIS, on the other hand, did not find any violation to have taken 
place during the parliamentary elections and the referendum.  Russian observers 
defended the election results, claiming that the vote showed authentic support for 
Lukashenko. (18) CIS observers declared that: ³The elections in Belarus were 
democratic, free, conscious and legitimate.² (19) 
 
Future of Belarus 
Belarus is going slowly down the path of complete isolation. The country is stuck 
in the ³bright past,² a distortion of even socialist reality. The administration clearly 
fears democratic processes deeply enough to choose isolation from the West 
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over the possibility of losing control. Perhaps pressure from the East, as well as 
the West, would bring a more positive result for the majority of Belarusian 
citizens. 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Ariela Shapiro 
 
CHECHNYA 
The Beslan incident revisited and revised 
Although more than one month has passed since the Beslan tragedy, the details 
of the incident are still shrouded by Russian political double-speak and 
bureaucratic secrecy.  When the hostage crisis ended with hundreds dead, the 
Russian authorities portrayed the anti-terrorist assault as an unplanned operation 
of last resort.  Officials claimed that the mysterious blast inside the school 
building, combined with terrorists shooting at the escaping children and adults, 
compelled the Russian Special Forces to conduct a rescue attempt.  However, 
recent reports by military analysts and first-hand observers, along with survivor 
testimony counter the official version of the story.  These accounts indicate that 
the Russian military knew a terrorist attack was to occur in North Ossetia and 
should have been prepared both tactically and strategically to handle a Beslan-
type scenario.  When the militants stormed the school in Beslan and caught the 
Interior Ministry troops in the North Caucasus unaware, the Kremlin, in an 
attempt to contain the incident, ordered the emergency anti-terrorist command 
unit in Beslan to end the crisis at all costs.  Due to the poor planning and heavy-
handed execution of the mission, the civilian death toll was much higher than 
envisaged.  The Russian government, being fully aware that its inept handling of 
the terrorist attack was a major factor in the death toll, has taken great pains to 
hide the exact details of the operation from Western journalists, the domestic 
public and human rights organizations.     
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One of the first independent accounts that contradicted the Kremlin¹s version of 
the Beslan incident was an editorial by military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer. (1)   
Felgenhauer traveled to Beslan from 1-5 September and related that he had 
noticed helicopters appearing in the school¹s vicinity 17 minutes after the assault 
began. According to Felgenhauer, this occurrence is inconsistent with the 
government¹s story, as it usually takes at least half an hour for a helicopter to 
warm up its engine.  Other indications that preparations for the assault were 
underway on the morning of 3 September are that the fenced off area near the 
school had been expanded, and that local hospitals were told to prepare for a 
large influx of patients.  In addition, some of the survivors told Izvestiya that the 
first blast came from somewhere near the gymnasium¹s porch and not along the 
school¹s inner wall as was claimed by Russian Special Forces and government 
officials. (2) 
 
On 13 October, Novaya gazeta obtained information from sources within the 
Investigation Commission of the Russian Federal Assembly.  According to the 
sources, tanks and armored vehicles were transported to the school¹s vicinity on 
2 September.  Moreover, several casings from rocket-propelled flame-throwers 
were found on the roof opposite the school.  Finally, some witnesses claim that a 
rocket-propelled grenade destroyed one of the walls of the gymnasium, while 
flame-throwers were used to set the roof of the school on fire at the onset of the 
attack. (3) The information in the Novaya gazeta story indicates that Russian 
special forces launched a planned attack, which ignored the possibility that some 
of the hostages might perish during the assault.  In the wake of the Novaya 
gazeta article, the parliamentary Commission officially stated that the Russian 
forces had used ³tanks, flame-throwers, and grenade launchers² during the 
assault. (4)  
 
While both articles suggest that Russian authorities were planning an assault on 
School Number #1, further evidence indicates that the Russian military knew a 
terrorist attack was to occur in North Ossetia.  In an 18 October Izvestiya 
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editorial, Lieutenant General Yevgeni Abrashin, first deputy commander of the 
federal interior troops in the North Caucasus, criticizes the Russian political and 
military establishments for not averting recent terrorist attacks in Grozny, Nazran 
and Beslan. (5) Abrashin claims that Federal forces failed to heed warnings of 
potential terrorist attacks, engage in preventive operations, or perform adequate 
follow-up or clean-up operations after both Kadyrov¹s assassination in Grozny 
and the raid in Nazran.  The Beslan tragedy could have been prevented if 
security officials had learned from the Ingushetia raid and organized check-points 
for vehicles, monitored roads by helicopters, and carried out a massive clean-up 
of ruined buildings in the suburbs of Vladikavkaz and Beslan.  While an Interior 
Ministry regiment was formed in Ingushetia following the events in Nazran, 
Abrashin asserts that the unit was not large enough to prevent militants from 
staging the Beslan attack.  During the alert, every military unit should have been 
put on duty, something that was not done.  Abrashin¹s editorial is even more 
damning in light of a 19 October public statement made by Putin aide Aslanbek 
Aslakhanov to the effect that Russian authorities had received advance warning 
of a raid into North Ossetia. (6) Although the authorities did not believe a school 
to be a viable target, they viewed the seizure of a theater or cinema as a 
possibility.  Aslakhanov and Abrashin indicate that, although the Federal forces in 
the North Caucasus were aware of an imminent terrorist attack, the Russian 
authorities did not take the necessary tactical or strategic military steps to 
prevent a potential assault.  
 
Additionally, although the Russian government knew the terrorists¹ demands, it 
chose not to negotiate with the militants but opted to launch a futile rescue 
mission.   In Shamil Basaev¹s letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Basaev 
demanded the recognition of the independence of Chechnya and the withdrawal 
of Russian troops from the republic.  He offered in exchange to stop all anti-
Russian activities in the Caucasus and to close all terrorist training camps.  
Basaev also promised that an independent Chechnya would become a member 
of the CIS and join the Collective Security Treaty. (7) Putin effectively answered 
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Basaev by stating in his 2 September speech that he would never ³endanger the 
fragile balance in the North Caucasus² by recognizing Basaev¹s claims. (8) The 
assault on the Beslan school occurred the next day, suggesting that authorities 
were already preparing for the operation and had no intention of cooperating with 
Basaev. Basaev clearly has placed himself solidly in the category of terrorists, 
with whom the Russian government will not negotiate; The Kremlin, therefore, 
may have assumed that the repercussions from dealing with Basaev would be far 
worse than the backlash from launching a poorly executed rescue operation in 
Beslan.  Moreover, if the Russian government had negotiated with Basaev, it 
would have deprived itself of its most convenient political black-sheep, leaving 
Putin to find another ³blame- magnet.² 
 
Can Alkhanov sideline Kadyrov? 
Upon his return from the PACE session in Strasbourg, President Alu Alkhanov 
began forming his cabinet.  On 13 October, Alkhanov requested that outgoing 
Prime Minister Sergei Abramov head the new government. (9)  Abramov 
announced on 14 October that all key figures from the previous cabinet, including 
First Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov, Deputy Prime Minister and 
Finance Minister Eli Isaev, and the ministers of economic development, industry, 
and agriculture would be reappointed to the same posts. (10)  Any changes to 
the composition of the government would be ³purely cosmetic² according to an 
interview Alkhanov gave to Nezavisimaya gazeta on 15 October. (11)  These 
reassignments reflect Alkhanov¹s desire to avoid alienating any powerful Russian 
or Chechen politicians and risk a debilitating power struggle.  
 
While Alkhanov is consolidating his government and building a loyal power 
structure, he also is trying to sideline his younger rival Ramzan Kadyrov.  
Kadyrov derives personal power from his command of a ³presidential security 
force² estimated to number between 2,000-8,000 men.  Acting on a proposal 
from Alu Alkhanov, Dmitri Kozak, Putin¹s envoy to the Southern Russia Federal 
District, named Chechen First Deputy Ramzan Kadyrov as his adviser on 
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security issues. (12)  Although Kadyrov¹s appointment as Kozak¹s aide appears 
to underscore Kadyrov¹s ³elevated status,² in reality, the new job will require 
Kadyrov spend a good deal of time outside of Chechnya.  (Kozak¹s headquarters 
are in Rostov-na-Donu.) (13)  That, in turn, would provide Alkhanov with the 
opportunity to strengthen his position without the risk of being undercut by the 
punitive actions of Kadyrov¹s security guards.  Alkhanov has already taken 
measures to restrict Kadyrov¹s use of his force against the Chechen civilian 
population, as indicated by Alkhanov¹s condemnation of Kadyrov¹s operation in 
the village of Novye Atagi.  When Kadyrov¹s security guards cordoned off Novye 
Atagi for three days to conduct a search for resistance sympathizers, searching 
every home and corralling all males between the ages of 14-16 into a barbed 
wire enclosure, Alkhanov dispatched officials to order Kadyrov to desist.  
Alkhanov subsequently warned that such ³egregious² human rights violations are 
likely to undercut the population¹s support for the pro-Russian Chechen 
leadership. (14)  As it is highly unlikely that the populace would ever support any 
Russian sponsored Chechen government, Alkhanov¹s interests lie in 
undercutting Kadyrov¹s power.   
 
Abkhaz elections:  What a messŠ 
The 3 October Abkhaz presidential elections have created a political deadlock in 
the break-away republic that threatens to catapult the region into civil 
confrontation.  On 11 October, Central Election Commission (CEC) officials 
declared Sergei Bagapsh the winner of the vote, amid widespread allegations of 
electoral fraud.  Raul Khajimba, the pro-Moscow candidate, refused to admit 
defeat and appealed to the Abkhaz Supreme Court to cancel the CEC¹s decision.  
Outgoing President Vladislav Ardzinba deepened the crisis by trying, without 
success, to resolve the dispute in Khajimba¹s favor.  On 12 October, the 
incumbent leader slammed the CEC¹s decision to appoint Bagapsh as ³absurd² 
while accusing the CEC of being an ³agent² of Tbilisi. (15) Ardzinba then called 
on parliament to dismiss the Abkhaz Prosecutor-General, Raul Korua, who had 
supported the validity of Bagapsh¹s election victory. (16) The parliament 
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responded by urging the general Abkhaz populace and the representatives of the 
presidential candidates¹ campaign staffs not to foment the situation, refrain from 
mass actions, and wait for a definitive decision from the Supreme Court. (17)  
Ignoring the parliament¹s heed to caution, the outgoing president denied printing 
privileges to four independent newspapers that had supported Bagapsh 
throughout the election campaign. (18)  
 
In an attempt both to wrest control from Arbinza and to appeal to the Abkhaz 
populace, Bagapsh called for an all Abkhaz National Convent rally from 14-16 
October. (19)  A convent is a ritual gathering of ethnically pure Abkhaz 
community elders that is used to appoint tribal or political leaders.  By specifically 
calling for a ³convent² as the venue by which to legitimize his presidential 
nomination, Bagapsh is designating himself as an ethnically and culturally ³pure² 
Abkhaz citizen capable of pursuing the region¹s interests.  Significantly, Bagapsh 
used the cultural setting of the convent rally to align himself politically with 
Russia.  On 14 October, Bagapsh declared that, ³Abkhazia¹s pro-Russian 
orientation is the choice of the Abkhaz peopleŠ² and that he was interested in 
strengthening ties with Moscow. (20) Bagapsh¹s rhetoric towards Moscow 
reflects his desire to repudiate Khajimba¹s accusations of his pro-Georgian 
leanings while also initiating a rapport with the Kremlin.    
 
Meanwhile, on 11 October, the Abkhaz Supreme Court considered Khajimba¹s 
petition for a new vote, but judicial proceedings were interrupted when Khajimba 
supporters challenged the impartiality of the judges assigned to hear the case. 
(21) On 12 October, four members of the CEC resigned, including its chairman 
Sergei Smyr, claiming that they were illegally pressured by Bagapsh and his 
supporters. (22)  Following the resignation of four of its members, the CEC was 
left without a quorum, and thus could not participate legally in the court¹s review 
of Khajimba¹s appeal.  The disputed presidential vote was thrown into deeper 
uncertainty on 18 October, when Abkhaz Supreme Court Chairwoman Alla 
Avidzba announced her resignation, and Abkhaz Supreme Court member Giorgi 
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Akaba was appointed to preside over the trial. (23)  At present, the Supreme 
Court has not reconvened to deliberate Khajimba¹s complaint, leaving the 
political fate of Abkhazia hanging in the balance. 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
KAZAKHSTAN 
Crisis of legitimacy? 
In the month since Kazakhstan¹s parliamentary elections, there has been a 
considerable degree of activity, all of which serves to undermine the country¹s 
³democratic² image. Both the electoral process and the results have been 
criticized harshly, not only by the OSCE, but also by Kazakhstan¹s opposition 
groups. (1) 
 
Immediately after the elections, Ak Zhol announced that it would be filing suit with 
the Kazakh Supreme Court in an attempt to overturn the polls. At the same time, 
Ak Zhol, Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan and the Communist Party announced 
their intention to organize a massive nationwide protest against the results. (2) 
As yet, there have been no reported rulings on the lawsuit from the Supreme 
Court, nor has any news regarding the protests emerged. (3) Despite their 
seeming failure to organize a major protest, Kazakhstan¹s opposition groups 
clearly have not been inactive. 
 
On 13 October, Asylbek Kozhakmetov, head of the political council of Ak Zhol 
held a press conference in Almaty. He stated that Democractic Choice of 
Kazakhstan and Ak Zhol were holding ³vigorous consultations² to determine the 
possibility of a merger between the two parties. The purpose of such a merger 
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would be to propose a joint Presidential candidate to stand against President 
Nursultan Nazarbaev in the Presidential elections, due to be held in January 
2006. (4) 
 
The move towards a merger seems to be one that has wide approval: on 15 
October, Akezhan Kazhegeldin, Kazakhstan¹s exiled former Prime Minister, 
published an open letter in Respublika. Kazhegeldin argued that the next 14 
months would prove decisive in showing whether Kazakhstan moved fully 
towards Democracy or ³authoritarian dictatorship.² (5) He stated that, in his view, 
the recent elections in Kazakhstan had been the least ³free and fair² in the 
country¹s history. Kazhegeldin claimed that in order to prevent a full-blown 
dictatorship, the opposition groups in Kazakhstan should immediately merge 
around the leadership of Ak Zhol in order to defeat Nazarbaev in 2006. Finally, 
Kazhegeldin intimated that he would be willing to join a united opposition party. 
(6) 
 
It is not clear whether Kazhegeldin published the letter with an altruistic motive of 
offering advice to the opposition, or whether he received news of the talks and 
published the letter with the intention of putting himself forward as the joint 
party¹s Presidential candidate in 2006. Such a development is unlikely to concern 
Nazarbaev deeply: in the last Presidential polls (which also were criticized by the 
OSCE), Nazarbaev garnered 78.3% of the vote. The most recent election has 
shown that Nazarbaev is prepared to do anything to keep his grip on power and 
to maintain Otan¹s majority in the Majlis. At this point in time, the most realistic 
question is not whether Nazarbaev will win the election, but what his margin of 
victory will be.  
 
KYRYZSTAN 
Kyrgyz-Russian relations 
In mid-October, several high-level Russian officials visited Kyrgyzstan for talks. 
First, on October 12, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov traveled to Bishkek. During 
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his stay, he met both with President Askar Akaev and Prime Minister Nikolai 
Tanayev, as well as his counterpart, Askar Aitmatov. (7) According to reports, the 
central point of discussion was the possibility of increasing cooperation on 
defense issues between the two nations: Lavrov informed Akaev of Vladimir 
Putin¹s decision to continue providing Russian military equipment and assistance 
at extremely favorable (Russian internal prices) terms. (8) A further topic 
discussed during Lavrov¹s visit was the issue of Kyrgyzstan¹s debt. Prime 
Minister Tanayev apparently requested that Russia speak for Kyrgyzstan at the 
Paris Club in order to help reduce its national debt. 
 
At the same time Lavrov was in Kyrgyzstan, Russia¹s Interior Minister, Rashid 
Nurgaliev was also in Bishkek to meet with his counterpart to discuss increased 
cooperation on counter-narcotics, organized crime and anti-terrorism. (10) 
 
CACO Summit 
In May of this year, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, apparently at 
the instigation of President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan, offered Russia full 
membership in the group. (11) On Monday, 18 October, the heads of state of four 
Central Asian Republics (only Turkmenistan is not a member) and President 
Putin met in Dushanbe. The leaders of the Republics held a joint news 
conference, to welcome Russia into the fold. Specifically, President Karimov 
noted that the Republics had ³always recognized Russia¹s historic and strategic 
interests in the region.² (12) He further noted that it was in Russia¹s interests that 
the settlement of outstanding disputes (such as water rights, energy, as well as 
security concerns) be resolved by ³joint efforts.² (13) 
 
The most important results of the summit were the decisions to create a common 
Central Asian market and to increase Russian investment in the region. 
Secondly, the heads of state agreed to expand their cooperation with regards to 
security issues. In relation to those issues, the Presidents decided to order their 
respective security services to work together in drawing up a list of terrorist 
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organizations, which are to be banned on each other¹s soil, and to coordinate 
operations against those groups. (14) 
 
The next summit of CACO will be held next summer in Kyrgyzstan. 
 
While cooperation with Russia is nothing new for the Central Asian states, the 
level of discourse seems to have increased in recent months. The United States¹ 
attention has of late been focused more on Iraq and the Middle East and less on 
Central Asia. The reduced interest in Central Asia on the part of the U.S. has 
been noted by President Putin, who seems determined to take advantage, and is 
attempting to regain, or increase, once more Russia¹s power and influence in the 
region. 
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